Polygraph Evidence: Part II by Giannelli, Paul C.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
1994 
Polygraph Evidence: Part II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Case Western University School of Law, paul.giannelli@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Litigation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Giannelli, Paul C., "Polygraph Evidence: Part II" (1994). Faculty Publications. 340. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/340 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
�@u@U1l�OcG §©O®U1lcG®� 
!P>@�}J�tr©JLQ)frll lE�o©J®[fi](G@� IP>©ltrli �� 
This is the second of a two-part article on polygraph evidence. 
The first part examined scientific issues and procedures. This article 
focuses on legal issues. 
The admissibility of polygraph ev­
idence was first considered and re­
jected in Frye v. United States, 1 the 
1923 case in which the D.C. Circuit 
established the general acceptance 
test for the admissibility of scientific 
evidence. 2 According to the court, 
the polygraph3 had not gained general 
acceptance in the fields of psychology 
a.TJd physiology. 4 From F1ye until the 
1970s, polygraph evidence was over­
whelmingly rejected by the courts. 5 
· Albert 1. Weaiherhead ill & Richard 
W. Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case 
Western Reserve University. This col­
umn is based in part on P. Giannelli & 
E. Imwinlcelried, Scielltific Evidence (2d 
ed. 1993). Reprinted by permission. 
I 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
2 The Frye case was overruled by ihe 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1993. Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 
S. Ct. 2786 (1993). Dauben, however, 
appiies only to federal trials and did not 
involve polygraph evidence. 
3 The instrument used in Frye mea­
sured oDJy one physiological response 
(i.e., blood pressure), whereas the mod­
em polygraph measures respiration and 
galvanic skin resistance in addition to 
blood pressure. The technique also has 
been improved through the development 
of control questions, the pretest inter­
view, and stimulation methods. 
4 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
5 People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 54, 
3 N.Y.S.2d 348, 351 (Sup. Ct. 1938), 
is an exception to the general rule of 
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l.n the early 1970s several trial 
courts departed from nearly fifty 
years of precedent and admitted the 
results of unstipulated polygraph ex­
aminations. fu ·United States v. 
Ridling, 6 a federal district court found 
that ''the theory of the polygraph is 
sound" and "directly relevant" to 
the issue (i.e., perjury) being liti­
gated� 7 The court \vent on to hold that 
the results of a polygraph exa.l11ina­
tion conducted by a court-appointed 
expert would be admissible under 
certai.-1 conditions. 3Polygraph results 
were also admitted in United States 
v. Zeiger.9 The Zeiger court held that 
the ''polygraph has been accepted 
by authorities in the field as being 
capable of producing highly proba­
tive evidence in a court of law when 
exclusion. That case, however, was soon 
undercut by People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 
204, 206, 18 N.E.2d 31, 32 (1938), 
which reaffirmed the New York Court of 
Appeals' earlier position excluding the 
results of polygraph examinations. 
6 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
7 Id. at 95. 
3 Admissibility was conditioned on the 
selection of a court-appointed expert and 
the expert's determination that the results 
indicated either truth or deception. If the 
appointed expert testified, the defen­
dant's own expert would also be permit­
ted to testify. !d. at 99. 
9 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 
475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per 
curiam). 
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properly used by competent, experi­
enced examiners. "10 fu addition, in 
People v. Cutter11 a California court 
admitted polygraph evidence during 
a suppression hearing after fmding 
that the ''polygraph now enjoys gen­
eral acceptance among authorities, 
including psychologists and re­
searchers . . . as well as polygraph 
examiners. "12 Several other courts 
also admitted polygraph evidence at 
this time. 13 
The trend in favor of admissibility 
that these cases seemed to forecast 
never developed. Zeiger was re­
versed per curiam, 14 while Ridling 
and Cutter were never appealed, thus 
precluding the opportunity for appel­
late approval. Nevertheless, the judi­
cial approach to polygraph evidence 
seems to have been altered by these 
decisions and the attention that they 
received in the literature. 15 In particu­
lar, a number of courts admitted poly­
graph results upon stipulation after 
these decisions were rendered. 
10 Jd. at 690. 
II 12  Crim. L.  Rptr. (BNA) 2133 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 6, 1 972). 
12 Jd. at 2 134. 
13 See United States v. Hart, 344 F. 
Supp. 522, 523-524 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); 
State v. Watson, 1 1 5  N.J. Super. 213, 
2 18, 278 A.2d 543, 546(Hudson Cty. Ct. 
1971) (sentencing); Walterv. O'Connell, 
72 Misc. 2d 316, 3 17, 339 N.Y.S.2d 
386, 388 (Queens Civ. Ct. 1972) (civil 
case); In re Stenzel, 71 Misc. 2d 719, 
336 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Niagara Cty. Fam. 
Ct. 1972) (civil case). 
14 United States v .  Zeiger, 475 F.2d 
1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
15 See generally Tarlow, '' Admissibil­
ity of Polygraph Evidence in 1975: An 
Aid in Determining Credibility in a Perju­
ry-Plagued System," 26 Hastings L.J. 
917 (1975); Note, "The Emergence of 
the Polygraph at Trial," 73 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1 120 (1973); Note, "Pinocchio's 
New Nose," 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 339 
(1973). 
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Generally, the cases can be divided 
into three groups. The first group 
consists of those courts that adhere 
to the traditional position, holding 
polygraph evidence per se inadmissi­
ble. A second group of courts admits 
polygraph evidence upon stipulation. 
Finally, a few courts entrust the ad­
missibility of polygraph evidence to 
the discretion of the trial court. 
Per Se Exclusion 
A majority of jurisdictions follow 
the traditional rule, holding poly­
graph evidence inadmissible per se. 
This category includes both federal16 
and state courts.17 fu addition, the 
16 E.g., United States v. A&S Council 
Oil Co., 947 F.2d 1 128, 1 133- 1 134 (4th 
Cir. 1991) ;  United States v. Hunter, 672 
F.2d 8 15, 817  (lOth Cir. 1982); United 
States v. Skeens, 494 F.2d 1 050, 1053 
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Mil. R. Evid. 707. 
See also Annotation, "Modem Status 
of Rule Relating to Admission of Results 
of Lie Detector (Polygraph) Test in Fed­
eral Criminal Trials," 43 A.L.R. Fed. 
68 (1979). 
17 E.g., People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 
354, 358 (Colo. 1981) ;  State v. Miller, 
202 Conn. 463,486, 522 A.2d 249,260-
261 (1987); People v. Baynes, 88 ill. 
2d 225, 244, 430 N.E.2d 1 070, 1079 
(1981); Harris v. State, 481 N.E.2d 382, 
384 (Ind. 1 985); Ice v. Commonwealth, 
667 S.W.2d 671, 675 (Ky. 1984); State 
v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 981 (La. 
1979); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 
352,359,255 N.W.2d 171, 173 (1977); 
State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 
(Minn. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 
1 141  (1986); Pennington v. State, 437 
So. 2d 37, 40(Miss. 1983); State v. Staat, 
8 1 1  P.2d 1261, 1263 (Mont. 1991); State 
v. Biddle, 599 S.W.2d 1 82, 185 (Mo. 
1980); State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628,645, 
300 S.E.2d 351 ,361 (1983); Birdsong v. 
State, 649 P.2d 786, 788 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1982); State v. Lyon, 304 Or. 221 ,  
231 ,  744 P.2d 231 ,  236 (1987); Com­
monwealth v. Brockington, 500 Pa. 2 16, 
220, 455 A.2d 627, 629 (1983); State v. 
Watson, 248 N.W.2d 398, 399 (S.D. 
1976); Romero v. State, 493 S.W.2d 
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exclusionary mle extends to evidence 
that a person was willing to take, 
took, or refused to take an examina­
tion. 1 8 
Some courts rely on the Frye gen­
eral acceptance test as the basis for 
exclusion 19 but the application of this 
test raises several issues. According 
to Frye, psychology and physiology 
are the fields in which general accep­
tance must be achieved.20 Several de­
cisions have expanded the ''field'' 
to include polygraph examiners.2 1 In 
United States v. Alexander,22 how­
ever, the Eighth Circuit rejected this 
view, saying that ''Experts in neurol­
ogy, psychiatry and physiology may 
offer needed enlightenment upon the 
basic premises of polygraphy. Poly­
graphists often lade extensive train­
ing in these specialized sciences.' '23 
206, 213 (Tex. Crirn. App. 1973): Rob­
inson v. CorruYJ10ll\Vealt.ti," 231 v�·. 142, 
156, 341 S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986); State 
v. Frazier, 252 S.E.2d 39, 49 (W. Va. 
1979); State v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 
279, 307 N. W. 2d 628, 653 (1981). 
"E.g., United States v. Murray, 784 
F.2d 188, 188-189 (6th Cir. 1986) (com­
ment about polygraph deliberately intro­
duced by experienced FBI agent was prej­
udicial error). See generally Annotation, 
"Propriety and Prejudicial Effect ofln­
forrning Jury that Witness in Criminal 
Prosecution Has Talcen Polygraph Test,'' 
15 A.L.R. 4th 824 (1982). 
19 E.g., Kelley v. State, 288 Md. 298, 
302, 418 A.2d 217, 219 (1980); People 
v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 377, 255 
N. W.2d 171, 181 (1977). 
2° Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
21 See United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. 
Supp. 685, 689 (D.D.C. ), rev'd, 475 
F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United 
States v. DeBetham, 348 F. Supp. 13 77, 
1388 (S.D. Cal.), ajf'd, 470 F.2d 1367 
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 
907 (1973); United States v. Wilson, 361 
F. Supp. 510,511 (D. Md. 1973). 
22 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975). 
23 ld. at 164 n.6. 
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A related issue concerns the extent 
to which the widespread use of the 
polygraph in law enforcement, secu­
rity, and industrial activities may be 
considered evidence of general ac­
ceptance. Some courts accorded such 
evidence considerable weight, 24 
while others ignored it. 25 
Still other courts reject Frye as the 
appropriate standard for determining 
the admissibility of scientific evi­
dence but still exclude polygraph evi­
dence.26 The U.S. Su�reme Court 
rejected Frye in 1993,2 but this does 
not mean that the federal courts' ap­
proach to polygraph evidence will 
also change. 
The principal �rgument against the 
admissibility of polyfraph evidence 
is lack of reliability. 2 Several points 
are made on this score: the lack of 
empirical validation/9 the numerous 
24 E. g., United States v. Piccinonna, 
885 F.2d 1529, 1532 (11th Cir. 1989). 
25 E.g., United States v. Alexander, 
526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975). 
26 E.g., State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 
975, 979 (La. 1979); State v. Brown, 297 
Or. 404, 416-417, 687 P.2d 751, 759 
(1984). 
27 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma­
ceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). 
28 See United States v. Alexander, 526 
F.2d 161, 166 (8t.l:i Cir. 1975) ("[W]e 
are still unable to conclude that there 
is sufficient scientific acceptability and 
reliability to warrant the admission of the 
results of such tests in evidence''); People 
v. Baynes, 88 lll. 2d 225, 239, 430 
N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (1981) ("[T]he pri­
mary obstacle in admission of polygraph 
evidence, stipulated to or not, has contin­
ually and consistently been the instru­
ment's disputed scientific reliability"). 
29 See United States v. Wilson, 361 F. 
Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973) ("incipi­
ent stage of experimental research"); 
People v. Monigan, 72 ill. App. 3d 87, 
96, 390 N.E.2d 562, 568 (1979) ("[T]he 
estimate of the degree of accuracy of 
polygraph tests seem[ s] to come from 
polygraph examiners themselves''). 
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uncontrollable factors involved in the 
exarnination,30 the subjective nature 
of the deception deterrnination/1 and 
the absence ofadequate standards for 
assessing the qualifications of exam­
iners. 32 Even if the reliability of the 
technique is established, additional 
problems are cited as reasons for ex­
clusion, for example, the danger that 
an opinion concerning the truthful­
ness of a witness will intrude too 
much into the jury's historic function 
of assessing credibility33; the danger 
that the jury will overvalue the ex­
pert's testimony34; and the possibility 
30 See People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 
354, 359 (Colo. 198 1 )  ("Several uncon­
trollable or unascertainable physiological 
and psychological responses may cause 
difficulty or error. "). 
31 People v. Anderson, 637 P .2d 354, 
360 (Colo. 1981) (The polygraph tech­
nique, ''albeit based on a scientific theo­
ry, remains an art with unusual responsi­
bility placed on the examiner"); People 
v. Monigan, 72 ill. App. 3d 87, 98, 390 
N.E.2d 562, 569 ( 1979) ("almost total 
subjectiveness surrounding the use of the 
polygraph and the interpretation of the 
results"). 
32 See People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 
354, 360 (Colo. 198 1 )  ("The absence of 
adequate qualification standards for the 
polygraph profession heighten[s] thepos­
sibility for grave abuse."); State v. Ca­
tanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 982 (La. 1979) 
(lack of judicial and legislative control 
over competence of examiners). 
33 See People v. Baynes, 88 lll. 2d 
225, 244, 430 N .E.2d 1070, 1079 ( 1981) 
("A potential trial by polygraph is an 
unwarranted intrusion into the jury func­
tion."); State v. Davis, 407 So. 2d 702, 
706 (La. 1981) ("usurps the jury's pre­
rogative on a question involving credi­
bility"). 
34 See United States v. Alexander, 526 
F.2d 161 ,  1 68 (8th Cir. 1975) ("When 
polygraph evidence is offered . . . , it is 
likely to be shrouded with an aura of near 
infallibility, akin to the ancient oracle of 
Delphi"); State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 
975, 981 (La. 1979) ("trier of fact is apt 
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that the trial will degenerate into a 
time-consuming trial of the tech­
niqueY 
Admission Upon Stipulation 
A substantial minority of courts 
admit polygraph evidence upon stipu­
lation of the parties. 36 For the most 
part, this result has been achieved by 
court decision, 37 although statutory 
to give almost conclusive weight to the 
polygraph expert's opinion"). 
Whether juries will be overawed by 
polygraph evidence is a matter of dispute. 
See generally Cavoukian & Heslegrave, 
"The Admissibility of Polygraph Evi­
dence in Court: Some Empirical Find­
ings," 4 Law & Hum. Behav. 1 1 7 
(1980); Carlson, Pasano & Jannuzzo, 
' 'The Effect of Lie Detector Evidence on 
Jury Deliberations: An Empirical 
Study," 5 J. Police Sci. & Admin. 148 
(1977); Markwart& Lynch, "The Effect 
of Polygraph Evidence on Mock Jury 
Decision-Making," 7 J. Police Sci. & 
Admin. 324 (1979). 
35 See People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 
352, 410, 255 N.W.2d 171, 196 (1977) 
("possibility of bogging down trials with 
collateral matters, perhaps resulting in 
a trial of the polygraph, or a battle of 
experts"); State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 
643, 300 S.E.2d 351, 359-360 (1983) 
(''possibility that the criminal proceeding 
may degenerate into a trial of the poly­
graph machine"). 
36 See generally Katz, "Dilemmas of 
Polygraph Stipulations," 14 Seton Hall 
L. Rev. 285 (1984). 
37 E.g., United States v. Piccinonna, 
885 F.2d 1 529, 1536 (1 1 th Cir. 1989); 
Anderson v. United States, 788 F.2d 5 1 7, 
519 (8th Cir. 1986); Brown v. Darcy, 
783 F.2d 1389, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986); Ex 
parte Clements, 447 So. 2d 695, 698 
(Ala. 1984); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 
274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962); 
Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138, 139, 
594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); State v. 
Chambers, 240 Ga. 76-77, 239 S.E.2d 
324, 325 (1977); State v. Fain, 1 16 Idaho 
82, 86, 774 P.2d 252, 256-257, cert. 
denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989); State v. 
Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 586-587 (Iowa 
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provisions may accomplish the same 
result. 33 At one time the trend toward 
admissibility by stipulation appeared 
so strong that it seemed only a matter 
of time before it became the majority 
rule. Later decisions, however, cast 
doubt on this possibility. Indeed, sev­
eral courts that initially admitted 
polygraph evidence upon stipulation 
have overruled their earlier decisions 
and now hold polygraph evidence per 
se inadmissible. 39 
Courts rejecting the admissibility 
of stipulated exaiu.inations argue that 
the stipulation does nothing to en-
1980); Corbett v. State, 584 P.2d 704, 
707 (Nev. 1978); State v. Souel, 53 Ohio 
St. 2d 123, 133-134, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 
1323-1324 (1978); State v. Rebeterano, 
681 P.2d 1265, 1268-1269 (Utah 1984). 
See generally Annotation, "Admissi­
bility of Lie Detector Test Taken Upon 
Stipulation That the Results WilllBe Ad­
missible k'1 Evidence," 53 A.L.R.3d 
1005 (1973). 
'' See Cal. Evid. Code § 351.1 ('west 
Supp. 1992): "Notwithstanding any oth­
er provision of law, the results of a poly­
graph examination, the opinion of a poly­
graph examiner, or any reference to an 
offer to talce, failure to take, or taking of 
a polygraph examination, shall not be 
admitted into evidence in any criminal 
proceeding . . .  unless all parties stipulate 
to the admission of such results." See 
also People v. Kegler, 197 Cal. App. 3d 
72, 90, 242 Cal. Rptr. 897, 909 (1987) 
(stipulation statute does not violate defen­
dant's constitutional rights). 
39 See State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 
645, 300 S.E.2d 351, 356-361 (1983), 
overruling State v. Milano, 297 N.C. 
485, 256 S.E.2d 154 (1979); Fulton v. 
State, 541 P.2d 871, 872 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 1975), overruling Castleberry v. 
State, 522 P.2d 257 (Olda. Crirn. App. 
1974), and Jones v. State, 527 P.2d 169 
(Olda. Crim. App. 1974); State v. Dean, 
103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 N.W.2d 628, 
653 (1981), overruling State v. Stanis­
lawslci, 62 Wis. 2d 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 
(1974). 
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hance the reliability of polygraph evi­
dence, which is the principal reason 
for exclusion. 40 According to some 
courts the answer to this objection 
is that admissibility does not derive 
''from the fact that the stipulation 
somehow imbues the evidence with 
reliability . . . but from the fact that 
the parties are estopped, by their stip­
ulated waiver of the right to object, 
from asserting the unacceptability of 
the evidence.' '41 Other courts that 
accept stipulated results recognize, at 
least i.mplicitly, that the technique 
possesses some degree of validity­
at least when the results are admitted 
under controlled conditions designed 
both to ensure thai the examination is 
properly administered by a compe­
tent examiner and to limit the purpose 
of admissibility. 42 Finally, some 
40 See Pulalr,is v. State, 476 P.2d 474, 
479 (Alaska 1970); State v. Grier, 307 
N.C. 628, 642, 300 S.E.2d 351, 359 
(1983); Com;nonwealth v. lBroclcington, 
500 Pa. 216, 220, 455 A.2d 627, 629 
(1983). 
See also People v. Monigan, 72 lll. 
App. 3d 87, 88, 390 N.E.2d 562, 563 
(1979) (stipulation rejected as contrary to 
public policy and as an invalid stipulation 
of law). 
41 Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 299 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1982). Accord State v. 
Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 586-587 (Iowa 
1980) (estoppel); State v. Rebeterano, 
681 P.2d 1265, 1269 (Utah 1984) (es­
toppel). 
42 E.g., United States v. Oliver, 525 
F.2d 731, 736 (8th Cir. 1975) ("We 
believe the necessary foundation can be 
constructed through testimony showing a 
sufficient degree of acceptance of the 
science of polygraphy by experienced 
practitioners in polygraphy and other re­
lated experts"), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 
973 (1976); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 
274, 283, 371 P.2d 894, 900 (1962) 
(polygraphy "has been developed to a 
state in which its results are probative 
enough to warra.T!t ad.. rnissibi!ity upon 
stipulation"). 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 
courts justify admission on a combi­
nation of these grounds.43 
The legal theory recognized for 
admission of stipulated results may 
be critical. The waiver or estoppel 
theory could permit the prosecution 
to introduce polygraph results in its 
case-in-chief unless the stipulation 
limits admissibility to impeachment. 
In contrast, courts permitting admis­
sion of stipulated results under con­
trolled conditions typically limit ad­
missibility to credibility, with the 
result that the evidence is admissible 
only if the defendant testifies. 
Conditions for Admission 
The leading case on admissibility 
by stipulation is State v. Valdez, 44 in 
which the Arizona Supreme Court 
held that stipulated polygraph results 
are admissible if the following condi­
tions are met: 
(1) That the county attorney, de­
fendant and his counsel all sign a 
written stipulation providing for de­
fendant's submission to the test and 
for the subsequent admission at trial 
of the graphs and the examiner's 
opinion thereon on behalf of either 
defendant or the state. 
(2) That notwithstanding the stip­
ulation the admissibility of the test 
results is subject to the discretion of 
the trial judge, i.e., if the trial judge 
is not convinced that the examiner is 
qualified or that the test was conduct­
ed under proper conditions he may 
refuse to accept such evidence. 
(3) That if the graphs and examin­
er's opinion are offered in evidence 
the opposing party shall have the right 
to cross-examine the examiner re­
specting: 
a. the examiner's qualifications 
and training; 
43 See State v. Renfro, 96 Wash. 2d 
902, 906-907, 639 P.2d 737, 739, cert. 
denied, 459 U.S. 842 (1982). 
44 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). 
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b. the conditions under which the 
test was administered; 
c. the limitations of and possibili­
ties for error in the technique of 
polygraphic interrogation; and 
d. at the discretion of the trial 
judge, any other matter deemed 
pertinent to the inquiry. 
( 4) That if such evidence is admit­
ted the trial judge should instruct the 
jury that the examiner's testimony 
does not tend to prove or disprove 
any element of the crime with which 
a defendant is charged but at most 
tends only to indicate that at the time 
of the examination defendant was not 
telling the truth. Further, the jury 
members should be instructed that it 
is for them to determine what corrob­
orative weight and effect such testi­
mony should be given.45 
The Valdez conditions have been 
adopted by many of the courts that 
admit stipulated polygraph results.46 
Several courts have altered the condi­
tions. For example, an oral agree­
ment in open court in lieu of a written 
agreement is recognized by some 
courts.47 In addition, a warning that 
the defendant is waiving the right 
against self-incrimination may also 
be required. 48 
Interpretation of Stipulation 
The interpretation of stipulations 
has raised a number of issues, 49 and 
45 /d. at 283-284, 371 P.2d at 900-
901. 
.u; E.g., Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 
294, 300 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State 
v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 1 34, 372 
N.E.2d 1 3 1 8, 1323 (1978). 
47 See Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 
299 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982); State v. 
Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 587 (Iowa 
1980). 
48 See Wynn v. State, 423 So. 2d 294, 
299 (Ala. Crim. App. 1982). 
49 E.g., Young v. State, 387 So. 2d 
5 12-513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (ex-
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the cases highlight the imporumce of 
drafting the stipulation with care. For 
example, an agreement to admit the 
results of a polygraph examination 
conducted by a competent examiner 
does not encompass an examination 
by an examiner who is not licensed 
under the applicable state statute. 50 
An agreement to admit the results of 
an examination permits the prosecu­
tion to use the results in its case­
in-chief in the absence of a state­
ment limiting the results to impeach­
ment. 51 
Moreover, some courts have held 
that the agreement must be strictly 
construed; thus, when the state failed 
to comply with a stipulation that re­
quired the defense attorney to review 
all questions, the examination results 
were inadmissible. 52 The argument 
for construing a stipulation strictly 
agaii1St the state is based on constitu­
tional grounds: ''Where an accused 
waives his constitutional right to re­
main silent in exchange for an agree­
ment that his statements will not be 
used under certain conditions which 
are fulfilled, the bargain made by the 
State will be enforced. "53 
perts in addition to examiner not permit­
ted to testify because their testimony was 
not part of the stipulation); Porterfield v. 
State, 150 Ga. App. 303, 257 S. E.2d 
372, 373 (1979) (testimony concerning 
inconclusive results not admissible be­
cause not part of the stipulation). 
50 Holcomb v. State, 268 Ark. 138, 
140, 594 S.W.2d 22, 23 (1980); State v. 
Tavernier, 27 Or. App. 115, 118, 555 
P . 2d 481,482 (1976). 
51 White v. State, 269 Ind. 479, 483-
484, 381 N.E.2d 481, 484-485 (1978); 
State v. Baskerville, 139 N.J. Super. 389, 
394, 354 A.2d 328, 330 (1976). 
52 Chambers v. State, 146 Ga. App. 
126, 128,245 S.E.2d 467,469 (1978). 
53 State v. Fuller, 387 So. 2d 1040, 
1041-1042 (Fla. Ct. App. 1980). 
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Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
In People v. Reeder'4 the court 
held that a defense counsel ''who, in 
advance of the examination, stipu­
lates that a defendant will submit to a 
polygraph examination and the re­
sults will be admissible at trial dem­
onstrates incompetence.' '55 This de­
cision was subsequently vacated and 
the defendant's incompetency claiiu 
rejected. 56 Later cases also reject such 
claims. For example, in one case the 
court held that when counsel agrees 
to an examination after the defendant 
insists on his innocence, there is no 
incompetence. 57 
In Houston v.. Lockharf8 the 
Eighth Circuit fou·nd ineffective as­
sistance of counsel where the defense 
attorney failed to have an oral stipula­
tion reduced to writing and then failed 
to raise the issue at trial after tl-Je 
prosecutor reneged on ihe agreement. 
Discretionary Admission 
A few courts recognize a trial 
court's discretion to admit polygraph 
evidence even in the absence of a 
stipulation. 59 The Seventh Circuit has 
54 129 Cal. Rptr. 646 (1976). 
55 ld. at 648. 
56 People v. Reeder, 65 Cal. App. 3d 
235, 135 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1976). 
57 People v. Berry, 118 Cal. App. 3d 
122, 134, 173 Cal. Rptr. 137, 143, cert. 
denied, 454 U. S. 966 (1981). See also 
State v. Sloan, 226 N.J. Super. 605, 
612-614, 545 A.2d 230, 233-234 (A.D. 
1988); Annotation, "Adequacy of De­
fense Counsel's Representation of Crimi­
nal Client Regarding Hypnosis and Truth 
Tests," 9 A.L.R. 4th 354 (1981). 
50 982 F.2d 1246, 1251-1252 (8th 
Cir. 1993). 
59 The following trial courts have ad­
mitted polygraph evidence at a criminal 
trial without a stipulation. United States 
v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 99 (E.D. 
Mich. 1972); People v. Daflie!s, 422 
N.Y.S.2d 832, 837 (Sup. Ct. 1979). 
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adopted this approach. 60 In most cas­
es, however, trial courts exercise this 
discretion by excluding polygraph 
evidence. 
The leading federal case is United 
States v. Piccinonna, 61 in which the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting en bane, 
ruled that polygraph evidence was 
admissible under certain circum­
stances, even in the absence of a 
stipulation. The court based its deci­
sion on a number of factors: 
Since the Frye decision, tremen­
dous advances have been made in 
polygraph instrumentation and 
technique. Better equipment is be­
ing used by more adequately 
trained polygraph administrators. 
Further, polygraph tests are used 
extensively by government agen­
cies. Field investigative agencies 
such as the FBI, the Secret Service, 
military intelligence and law en­
forcement agencies use the poly­
graph. Thus, even under a strict 
adherence to the traditional Frye 
standard, we believe it is no longer 
accurate to state categorically that 
polygraph testing lacks general ac­
ceptance for use in all circum­
stances.62 
The court went on to specify sever­
al conditions for admissibility. Poly­
graph evidence is admissible to im­
peach or corroborate the testimony of 
a witness if (1) adequate notice is 
provided; (2) the opposing side has 
the opportunity to conduct its own 
test; and (3) the requirements of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence are satis­
fied-for example, corroboration is 
permissible only after impeachment. 
60 E.g., United States v. Dietrich, 854 
F.2d 1 056, 1 059 (7th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Tucker, 773 F.2d 136, 141 (7th 
Cir. 1985), cerl. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 
(1986). 
61 885 F.2d 1 529 (1 1th Cir. 1989). 
62 ld. at 1 532. 
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Even if all three conditions are met, 
the decision on admissibility is en­
trusted to the discretion of the trial 
court. The trial court may reject the 
evidence because the examiner was 
not qualified, the test was poorly ad­
ministered, or the questions were im­
proper. On remand, the trial court 
excluded the evidence because the 
questions and answers were irrele­
vant, and any probative value was 
outweighed by the danger of mis­
leading the jury. 63 
Of the state jurisdictions, New 
Mexico has gone the furthest in ad­
mitting polygraph evidence. In State 
v. Dorsey64 the New Mexico Supreme 
Court held that polygraph results 
were admissible if (1) the operator is 
qualified; (2) the testing procedures 
were reliable; and (3) the test of the 
particular subject was valid. 65 Cur­
rently, New Mexico Evidence Rule 
707 governs admissibility. This rule 
permits the admissibility of poly­
graph evidence in the discretion of 
the trial court under the following 
conditions. First, the examination 
must be conducted by a qualified ex­
aminer. Minimum qualifications in­
clude five years' experience adminis­
tering or interpreting examinations or 
equivalent academic training and at 
least twenty hours of continuing edu­
cation during the twelve months prior 
to the examination offered in evi­
dence. 66 Second, the examination 
must include at least two relevant 
questions, at least three charts, and 
be quantitatively scored. 67 Moreover, 
the pretest interview and actual test­
ing must be recorded on an audio or 
video recording device. 68 Third, the 
63 United States v. Piccinonna, 729 F. 
Supp. 1 336 (D.C. Fla. 1990). 
64 88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). 
65 !d. at 184-185, 539 P.2d at 205. 
66 N.M. Evid. R. 707(b). 
67 N.M. Evid. R. 707(c). 
68 N.M. Evid. R. 707(e). 
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party intending to offer the evidence 
generally must provide thirty-day 
written notice to the other party, 
including copies of the examii1er's 
report, each chart, the audio or video 
recording of the pretest interview and 
actual testing, and a list of any prior 
examinations taken by the subject. 69 
At one time Massachusetts also 
admitted polygraph evidence without 
stipulation. In Commonwealth v. A 
Ju-venile (1974f0 the Supreme Judi­
cial Court of Massachusetts held 
polygraph evidence admissible if the 
defendant agreed i.n advance to the 
admission of test results and the trial 
judge conducted a ''close and search­
ing inquiry'' into the qualifications 
of the examii1er, the methods em­
ployed in the examination, and the 
suitability of the defendant for test­
ing. 71 In 1989, however, the court 
abruptly abandoned the position it 
had adopted in .c4 Juvenile and r.Jled 
polygraph evidence inadmissible in 
criminal trials. 72 According to the 
court, the ''failure of the basic theory 
of polygraphy to have gained general 
acceptance among physiological and 
psychological authorities' m required 
it to reevaluate its position. 
In 1987 the Court of Military Ap­
peals ruled that polygraph evidence 
was admissible in the discretion of 
the trial judge.74 In 1991, however, 
Military Ru1e of Evidence 707(a) ab­
mgated this decision. The rule reads: 
"Notwithstanding any other provi­
sion of law, the results of a polygraph 
examination, the opinion of a poly-
69 N.M. Evid. R. 707(d). 
70 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 
(1974). 
71 !d. at 426, 313 N.E.2d at 124. 
72 Conunonwealth v. Mendes, 406 
Mass. 201,547 N. E.2d 35 (1989). 
73 /d. at 201, 547 N.E.2d at 35-36. 
" United States v. Gipson, 24 M.J. 
246, 253-254 (C.M.;�,. 1987). 
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graph exmni11er, or any reference to 
an offer to take, failure to take, or 
talcii!g of a polygraph examination, 
shall not be admitted into evi­
dence. "75 
Constitutional Arguments 
Several constitutional arguments 
have been advanced to support the 
admissibility of polygraph evidence. 
First, defendants have argued that 
the constitutional right to present a 
defense includes the right to intro­
duce favorable polygraph results. 
Second, defendants also have argued 
for a constitutional right to impeach 
prosecution witnesses if these wit­
nesses have failed government-ad­
ministered ex�nations. 
Right to Present a Defense 
The most common argument fo­
cuses on an accused's right to present 
a defense. 76 In State v. Dorsey77 a 
New Mexico appellate court reversed 
a trial court's exclusion of polygraph 
evidence, holding that a defendant 
has a due process right to present 
critical and reliable defense evidence. 
In Jackson v. Garrison78 a federal 
district court held that the exclusion 
of polygraph evidence denied a de­
fendant a fair trial. In State v. Sims79 
an Ohio trial court found an implied 
right to present defense evidence in 
the compulsory process guarantee 
that, it concluded, compelled the ad-
75 Mil. R. Evid. 707. 
76 See generally Clinton, ''The Right 
to Present a Defense: An Emergent Con­
stitutional Guarantee in Criminal Tri­
als," 9 Ind. L. Rev. 713, 810-815 
(1976). 
77 87 N.M. 323, 532 P. 2d 912, 914-
915 (N.M. App.), aff'd on other grounds, 
88 N.M. 184, 539 P.2d 204 (1975). 
78 495 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.N.C. 1979), 
rev'd, 677 F.2d 371 (4th Cir. 1981). 
79 52 Ohio Misc. 31, 32, 369 N.E.2d 
'1 A At:.. f 1"1 D 1 0'7'7\ �i,iV\V.Jl , �711)• 
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nusswn of defense polygraph evi­
dence. The precedential value of 
these cases, however, is not strong. 
Jackson was overruled on appeal, 80 
Dorsey was affirmed but not on con­
stitutional grounds, 81 and Sims is in­
consistent with later Ohio cases. 82 
The right to present defense evi­
dence also was cited in McMorris 
v. Israel, 83 in which the defendant 
offered to stipulate to the admission 
of a polygraph examination. Al­
though stipulated polygraph results 
were admissible under state law at 
that time,84 the prosecutor, without 
offering any reasons, refused to stipu­
late. In granting habeas corpus relief, 
the Seventh Circuit wrote: ''Where 
credibility is as critical as in the in­
stant case, the circumstances are such 
as to make the polygraph evidence 
materially exculpatory within the 
meaning of the Constitution. "85 The 
court, however, rested its decision on 
narrower grounds; that is, the prose­
cution's refusal to stipulate without 
offering a valid ground for the refusal 
80 Jackson v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 371 
(4th Cir. 1981). 
81 State v. Dorsey, 88 N.M. 1 84, 539 
P.2d 204 (1975). 
82 Although the Ohio Supreme Court 
accepted the admission of stipulated poly­
graph results in State v. Souel, 53 Ohio 
St. 2d 123, 132, 372 N.E.2d 1 3 1 8, 1 323 
(1978), it rejected the constitutional argu­
ments for admission in State v. Levert, 
58 Ohio St. 2d 2 1 3, 215, 389 N.E.2d 
848, 850 (1979). 
83 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 455 U.S. 967 (1982). 
84 At the time McMorris was tried, 
Wisconsin admitted stipulated polygraph 
results. After the Seventh Circuit deci­
sion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court over­
ruled its prior decision and held poly­
graph evidence per se inadmissible. State 
v. Dean, 103 Wis. 2d 228, 279, 307 
N.W.2d 628, 653 (1981). 
1!5 McMorris v. Israel, 643 F.2d 458, 
462 (7t.h Cir. 1981). 
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deprived the defendant of due pro­
cess: "From all that appears, [the 
prosecutor] was acting solely for tac­
tical reasons in the belief that a test 
would not be helpful to his case. 
If the prosecutor refuses and states 
reasons, it then becomes the duty of 
the court to determine whether the 
reasons offered rise above the purely 
tactical considerations present in a 
given case. "86 
The response to McMorris has 
been chilly. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
characterized McMorris as a "dubi­
ous constitutional holding.' '87 Some 
courts simply reject the argument that 
the prosecution is required to provide 
reasons for its refusal to stipulate. 88 
Other courts reject the broader propo­
sition that there is a constitutional 
right to present polygraph evidence. 89 
Moreover, the Seventh C ircuit itself 
has noted that McMorris applies only 
where a jurisdiction accepts stipulat­
ed polygraph results90 and does not 
change a trial court's discretionary 
authority to exclude polygraph evi­
dence.91 
86 !d. at 466. 
87 Israel v. McMorris, 455 U.S. 967, 
970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
88 See Jones v. Weldon, 690 F.2d 835, 
838 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1982). 
89 E.g.,  Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 
1228, 1238 (9th Cir. 1984); United States 
v. Gordon, 688 F.2d 42, 44 (8th Cir. 
1982); Milano v. Garrison, 677 F.2d 
374, 375 (4th Cir. 1981); Jackson v. 
Garrison, 677 F.2d 371 ,  373 (4th Cir. 
1981); United States v. Glover, 596 F. 2d 
857, 867 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 
u.s. 860 ( 1979). 
90 United States v. Black, 684 F.2d 
481, 483 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 
u.s. 1043 (1982). 
91 United States v. Feldman, 7 1 1  F.2d 
758, 767 (7th Cir.), cen. denied, 464 
U.S. 939 (1983); United States v. Lupo, 
652 F.2d 723, 729 (7th Cir. 1981), cen. 
denied, 457 U.S. 1 135 (1982). 
CRIMINAl lAW BULLETIN 
Impeachment of Prosecution 
Witnesses 
In United States v. A&S Council 
Oil Co. 92 the defendant sought "a 
Confrontation Clause exception to 
the general inadmissibility of poly­
graph results to accommodate an ac­
cused's attacks on ihe credibility of 
key government witnesses. "93 The 
prosecution witness had entered into 
a plea agreement with the govern­
ment that required the witness to take 
a polygraph examination if requested 
by the prosecution. The witness also 
agreed that the results were admissi­
ble against llli-n in a court of law. The 
witness thereafter failed two poly­
graph examinations. The defense 
sought to introduce these examina­
tions as impeachment evidence. Al­
though the Fourth Circuit aclrnowl­
edged that the facts of the case were 
"compelling," it felt bound by its 
prior decisions mat had excluded 
polygraph results.94 Accordingly, the 
court rejected £L.'1 ''exculpatory use'' 
exception for polygraph evidence. 
A sii!lilar issue was raised in Unit­
ed States v. Han, 95 in which the court 
ruled that a prosecution witness's 
polygraph results, which indicated 
deception, were admissible under 
Brady v. Mmyland. 96 The court inter­
preted Brady as requiring the disclo­
sure of "any evidence which may 
tend to exculpate a defendant.' '97 
Since the prosecution initially 
thought the polygraph sufficiently re-
9' 947 F.2d 1128 (4th Cir. 1991). 
93 !d. at 1133. 
94 "The broad exception Council 
seeks to create for an accused's attacks 
on government witnesses would . . . 
conflict with [our] precedents." !d. at 
1134. 
95 344F. Supp. 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
96 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
97 United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 
522,523 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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liable to conduct an examination, it 
had the burden, according to the 
court, of explaining why the test re­
sults should be excluded at trial. 
Subsequent cases, however, have 
generally rejected this reasoning. 98 
For example, in United States v. Mac­
Entee, 99 the courfcommented: 
The Hal1 court makes an incorrect 
logical leap. Brady . . . stands for 
the principal [sic] that the constitu­
tion requires the government to 
turn over exculpatory information 
to the defense. Once the govern­
ment turns over such information, 
however, the question of whether 
it may be introduced at trial is 
governed by the Federal Rules of 
Evidence, not by Brady.100 
Proceedings Other 17wn Trial 
Courts have admitted! polygraph 
evidence at suppression hearings, 1 0 1 
sentenci11g heartiigs, 102 motions for 
new trial proceedings, 1 03 and prison 
98 E.g., Peopie v. Price, 1 CaL 4th 
324, 419, 321 P.2d 610, 663, 3 Cal. 
Rptr. 106, 159 (1991); State v. Waff, 373 
N.W.2d 18,25 (S.D. 1985); Robinson v. 
Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 156, 341 
S.E.2d 159, 167 (1986); State v. Young, 
89 Wash. 2d 613, 622-623, 574 P.2d 
1171, 1177, cnt. denied, 439 U.S. 870 
(1973). 
99 713 F. Supp. 829 (E.D. Pa. 1989). 
100 !d. at 831. 
101 Peoole v. Cutter. 12 Crim. L. Reo. 
(BNA) 2i33 (Cal. S�per. Ct. Nov. 6, 
1972); People v. McKim1ey, 137 Mich. 
App. 110, 115, 357 N.W.2d 825, 828 
(1984). 
102 State v. Jones, 110 Ariz. 546, 551, 
521 P.2d 978, 983, celt. denied, 419 
U.S. 1004 (1974); State v. Watson, 115 
N.J. Super. 213,218,278 A.2d 543,546 
(1971). 
103 State v. Catanese, 368 So. 2d 975, 
982-983 (La. 1979); People v. Barbara, 
400 Mich. 352, 412-414, 255 N.W.2d 
171, 197-199 (1977); People v. Snell, 
118 Mich. App. 750, 768, 325 N.W.2d 
C:C'"J t::.'/'1 /1 ()0,.,\ JUJ, J/.L �!70L.J. 
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disciplinary hearings.104 They have 
also ruled that polygraph evidence 
may be considered in determining 
probable cause. 105 
Some of these courts distinguish 
such proceedings from the trial itself. 
For example, the Michigan Supreme 
Court has held polygraph evidence 
admissible on a motion for a new 
trial, although the same evidence is 
inadmissible at trial.106 According to 
the court, polygraph results may be 
of some assistance to the trial judge 
in deciding issues that typically arise 
in proceedings to determine whether 
a new trial should be granted: ''Tradi­
tionally, the testimony of recanting 
or suddenly discovered witnesses has 
been highly suspect, largely because 
it is impossible to determine when the 
truth is being told. The polygraph 
won't do this either; not even its most 
ardent proponents would so contend. 
But it might help. " 107 The court also 
commented that admissibility in this 
context would provide an ''opportu­
nity to test [the] effectiveness of the 
polygraph. "108 
Fifth Amendment 
In Schmerber v. Califomia109 the 
U.S. Supreme Court indicated, albeit 
in dictum, that compelled submission 
to a polygraph test would violate the 
104 Toussaint v. McCarthy, 926 F .2d 
800, 803 (9th Cir . ), cen. denied, 1 12 S. 
Ct. 213  ( 1990); Lenea v. Lane, 882 F.2d 
1 171, 1 174 (7th Cir. 1989). 
105 Bennett v. Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 
400, 405-406 (5th Cir. 1989); State v. 
Coffey, 309 Or. 342,345-347,788 P.2d 
424, 425-427 (1990); State v. Cherry, 
61 Wash. App. 301, 810 P.2d 990, 942-
943 (199 1 ). 
106 People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 
41 1-414, 255 N.W.2d 171, 197-198 
(1977). 
107 Jd. at 415,255 N.W.2d at 199. 
JOB Jd. 
109 384 u.s. 757 ( 1966). 
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Fifth Amendment's prohibition 
against compelled self-incrimination: 
Some tests seemingly directed to 
obtain ''physical evidence,'' for 
example, lie detector tests measur­
ing changes in body function dur­
ing iilterrogation, may actually be 
directed to eliciting responses 
which are essentially testimonial. 
To compel a person to submit to 
testing in which an effort will be 
made to determine his guilt or in­
nocence on the basis of physiologi­
cal responses, whether willed or 
not, is to evoke the spirit and histo­
ry of the Fifth Amendment. 110 
The courts that have admitted poly­
graph evidence have recognized the 
applicabiity of the privilege in this 
context: ''The polygraph results are 
essentially testimonial in nature and 
therefore a defendant could not be 
compelled initially to take such an 
exanlination on the Commonwealth's 
motion." 111 The protection of the 
privilege also extends to any com­
ment by the prosecution that a defen­
dant had refused to submit to an 
exanlination. 112 The defendant, how­
ever, may waive the privilege.113 
110 /d. at 764. 
111 Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 
Mass. 421,  431, 3 13 N.E.2d 120, 127 
(1974). 
112 See Bowen v. Eyman, 324 F. Supp. 
339, 341 (D. Ariz. 1970); MacDonald v. 
State, 1 64 Ind. App. 285, 293-294, 328 
N.E.2d 436, 441 ( 1975). 
113 See Fernandez v. Rodriguez, 761 
F.2d 558, 562 (lOth Cir. 1 985) (agree­
ment to stipulate to admission of poly­
graph results was not a valid waiver of 
privilege against self-incrimination); 
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 73 1, 
734-736 (8th Cir. 1975), cen. denied, 
424 U.S. 973 (1976) ; United States v .  
Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90, 97 (E.D. Mich. 
1972). 
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Confessions 
It is not uncommon for a defendant 
to make an incriminatory statement 
before, during, or after a polygraph 
examination. Since polygraph exami­
nations involve testimonial evidence 
under the Fifb'1 Amendment privi­
lege, the admissibility of statements 
made during the examination process 
often are subject to Miranda warn­
ings.114lvliranda warnings, however, 
are required only if the defendant is 
in custodyi15 and is interrogated. 116 A 
person who is not under arrest and 
who voluntarily agrees to take th� 
examination is not "in custody. "117 
Moreover, the defendant may waive 
his right to remain silent and to coun­
sel when he agrees to take a polygraph 
examination. 118 
Even if the defendant initially as­
serts his right to counsel after receiv­
ing Miranda warnings, he may subse­
quently waive that right by initiating 
conversations with the police, includ­
ing a request for a polygraph exami-
114 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966). See also United States v. Little 
Bear, 583 F. 2d 41 I, 414 (8th Cir. 1978) 
(tailoring Miranda warnings for poly­
graph ex<uninations). 
'15 See Berlcemer v. McCarty, 468 
U.S. 420 (1984). 
116 SeeP'-hodeisland v. Initis, 446 U.S. 
291 (1980). 
117 See Jenner v. Smith, 982 F.2d 329, 
334-335 (8th Cir. ) (defendant not in cus­
tody at time incriminating statements 
made in response to examiner's statement 
that defendant had shown deception on 
polygraph test), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
81 (1993). 
113 See United States v. Iron Thunder, 
714 F.2d 765, 771-772 (8th Cir. 1983); 
Henry v. Dees, 658 F. 2d 406, 408 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (waiver invalid where examin­
er asked questions of a mentally retarded 
defendant that went beyond agreement to 
take examination). 
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nation.119 fu Wyrick v. Fields120 the 
Supreme Court held that statements 
made by a defendant during a post­
test interview were admissible where 
the defendant, who was represented 
by counsel, requested a polygraph 
examination and was informed of his 
Miranda rights. The Court rejected 
the argument that new warnings were 
required prior to the post-test inter­
view. However, not all statements 
that are made after an examination 
are necessarily admissible; they are 
admissible only if the defendant vol­
untarily and lmowingly waives his 
rights to remain silent and to 
counsel. 121 
In addition to Fifth Amendment 
Miranda rights; a defendant's admis­
sions during a polygraph examination 
may be excluded from evidence if 
they are obtained in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel122 
or are involuntary under t.he due pro­
cess clause.123 rv1oreover, some 
courts have held that polygraph evi­
dence is admissible for the limited 
purpose of showing the voluntariness 
of a confession.124 
119 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 
1039 (1983). 
120 459 U.S. 42 (1982). 
121 See United States v. Gill yard, 726 
F.2d 1426, 1429-1430 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(defendant did not validly waive right to 
a post-test interrogation by officers other 
than the examiner). 
122 See Barrera v. Young, 794 F. 2d 
1264, 1271-1272 (7th Cir. 1986) (right 
to counsel waived); Fields v. Wyrick, 
706 F.2d 879, 880-881 (8th Cir. 1983) 
(same). 
123 See Barrera v. Young, 794 F.2d 
1264, 1271-1272 (7th Cir. 1986) (con­
fession during polygraph exam not invol­
untary). See generally Annotation, "Ad­
missibility in Evidence of Confession 
Made by Accused in Anticipation of, 
During, or Following Polygraph Exami­
nation," 89 A.L.R. 3d 230 (1979). 
124 See United States v. Kampiles; 609 
F. 2d 1233, 1244-1245 (7th Cir. 1979), 
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Pretrial Agreements 
In a few reported cases prosecutors 
have gone beyond stipulating to the 
admissibility of test results and have 
agreed to dismiss the charges if the 
defendant passes a polygraph exami-. 
nation . 125 In some cases the defendant 
had no obligations under such an 
agreement other than to cooperate in 
the examination. 126 In other cases the 
defendant either agreed to admit the 
test results127 or to enter a plea to a 
reduced charge128 in the event he 
failed the examination. 
A determinative factor in the re­
ported cases has been the existence 
of a statute requiring court approval 
for dismissals. When a trial court 
approved the dismissal or was aware 
of the agreement, appellate courts 
have held the prosecutor bound by 
the agreement on public policy 
grounds. 129 According to t.hese 
courts, the agreement represents a 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 954 (1980); Anno­
tation, ' 'Admissibility of Polygraph Evi­
dence at Trial on Issue of Voluntariness 
of Confession Made by Accused, "  92 
A.L.R. 3d 1317 ( 1979). 
125 See generally Annotation, "En­
forceability of Agreement by State Offi­
cials to Drop Prosecution if Accused Suc­
cessfully Passes Polygraph Test, ' ' 36 
A.L.R. 3d 1280 (197 1). 
126 See People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 
306, 309, 235 N.W.2d 581,  583 ( 1975); 
State v. Sanchell , 191  Neb. 505, 509-
510, 2 1 6  N.W.2d 504, 507-508 (1974) 
(agreement not binding without court ap­
proval), cert. denied, 420 U.S.  909 
(1975). 
127 See Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 ,  
424-425 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 969). 
128 See State v. Davis, 188 So. 2d 24, 
27 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
129 Butler v. State, 228 So. 2d 421 ,  
. 424 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); State v. 
Davis, 1 88 So. 2d 24, 28 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1966) ; People v. Reagan, 395 
Mich. 306, 3 1 8, 235 N.W.2d 5 8 1 ,  587 
(1975) . 
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' 'pledge of public faith-a promise 
made by state officials-and one that 
should not be lightly disregarded. ' '  130 
On the other hand, when court ap­
proval was required but not obtained, 
prosecution has been permitted even 
though a defendant successfully 
passed the examination. 131 
Notwithstanding the lack of court 
approval, enforcement of such an 
agreement may be required on consti­
tutional grounds .  In agreeing to take 
a polygraph examination, the defen­
dant waives his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination. 
It seems questionable that the state 
could induce such a waiver by prom­
ising to dismiss the charges in the 
event the defendant passes the exarni­
�ation and then renege on that prom­
Ise after the defendant has waived his 
constitutional rights. 132 The illinois 
Supreme Court cited the defendant' s  
waiver o f  the privilege i n  ruling that 
the state must abide by its agreement 
to dismiss if the defendant passes a 
polygraph test. 133 Similarly, a Penn­
sylvania appellate court enforced an 
agreement between a police officer 
and the defendant, which required the 
dismissal of charges if the defendant 
passed a polygraph test. 134 The court 
rejected the argument that the officer 
130 State v. Davis, 1 88 So. 2d 24, 27 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966). 
131 State v. Sanchell, 1 9 1  Neb. 505 , 
5 10, 216  N.W.2d 504, 508 (1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 909 (1975). See also 
Snead v. State, 415 So. 2d 887, 889 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (oral agreement 
y.'ith sheriff who lacked authority to enter 
mto such an agreement is not enforce­
able). 
132 Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 
U.S .  �57 (1971) (enforceability of plea 
bargam) . 
133 People v. Stark, 1 06 lll.2d 441 , 
452, 478 N.E.2d 350, 355-356 (1985).  
134 Commonwealth v. Scuilli 62 1 
A.2d 620 (Pa. Super. 1993). ' 
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did not have the authority to make 
such an agreement. ' 'Fundamental 
fairness ' '  135 required the Common­
wealth to abide by its commitments. 
Conclusion 
This two-part article on polygraph 
evidence began with a discussion of 
two 1989 polygraph cases: United 
States v. Piccinonna136 and Common­
wealth v. Mendes. 1 37 In Piccinonna 
the Eleventh Circuit ruled polygraph 
evidence admissible based in part on 
' 'new empirical evidence and schol­
arly opinion which have undercut 
many of the traditional arguments . 
against admission of polygraph evi­
dence. " 1 38 In Mendes, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
abruptly rejected its earlier landmark 
decision admitting polygraph evi­
dence. According to the court, exclu­
sion \Vas compelled owL.1.g to "tl1e 
:failure of the basic theory of poly­
graphy to have gained general accep­
tance among physiological and psy­
chological authorities. ' '  139 These 
135 !d. at 625 (citing the doctrine of 
equitable immunity). 
136 885 F.2d 1529 (11th Cir. 1989). 
137 406 Mass. 201, 547 N.E.2d 35 
(1989). 
130 885 F.2d at 1533. 
139 406 Mass. at 201, 547 N. E.2d at 
35-36. 
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courts reached diametrically opposed 
views on the reliability of polygraph 
evidence, both basing their respective 
opinions on ' 'recent scientific re­
search. " In fact, neither court cited 
the most recent and comprehensive 
research on the subject . 
These cases illustrate t\vo distinct 
problems. First, notwithstanding the 
polygraph's  long history, the best re­
search has onJy recently been report­
ed. One researcher noted in 1988 that 
" [o]nly now are superior paradigms 
being developed which combine the 
ground truth of the laboratory with 
the realism of field applications . ' '  140 
Second, courts encounter substan­
tial problems when dealing with sci­
entific evidence. The U.S. Supreme 
Court's recent rejection of the F1J7e 
test in Daube11 v. Merrell Dow Phar­
maceuticals, Inc. , 14 1 will not make 
L�ings any easier. Indeed, Daubert 
places .even greater responsibility on 
the judiciary . 
1"10 Barland, "The Polygraph Test in 
the USA and Elsewhere,' '  in The Poly­
graph Test: Lies, Tmth and Science 76 
(A. Gale ed. 1988). See also Department 
of Defense, ' 'The Accuracy and Utility 
of Polygraph Testing," reprinted in 1 3  
Polygraph 1 ,  58 (1984) (there ' 'has been 
more scientific research conducted on lie 
detection in the last six years than in the 
previous 60 years"). 
141  113 S .  Ct. 2786 (1993). 
